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The recent Proposed Directive on the patentability of computer-
implemented inventions takes the European Community a step further down 
the road towards patents for computer software.  If the goal of the Proposed 
Directive is to facilitate market entry for individual programmers and small 
and medium enterprises -- as it must be within the framework of the 
European Treaty -- then the European Commission should not be 
expanding intellectual property rights in technology goods, which, by their 
very nature, will lose value to the public long before their monopoly rights 
expire.  Rather, the Commission should look to the open source movement 
and other, more temporal means of protection to spur innovation and 
increase Europe's competitiveness on the worldwide market for technology 
goods. 
INTRODUCTION  
¶1 The recent Proposed Directive on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions2 confirms 
that computer software, “as such,” is not patentable in the EU.3  As the European Commission’s explanatory 
memorandum for the Proposed Directive admits, however, “thousands” of patents have been granted by the 
European Patent Office (EPO) and the national patent offices for computer-implemented inventions despite 
the seemingly per-se exclusion.4  Previous attempts to harmonize the Community-wide policy on the 
patentability of computer software have failed due to differing interpretations of key decisions of the EPO 
Technical Board of Review by the national courts of the various European Union (EU) Member States.5 
¶2 The goal of the Proposed Directive is to set a harmonized standard throughout Europe, while at the 
same time, to strengthen the software industry within the common market and make it more competitive 
worldwide.6  Recognizing the significant impact that the computer software industry has on the general 
                                                     
1 Heather Ann Forrest is an associate in the London office of Kilpatrick Stockton, LLP.  Her practice focuses on 
intellectual property and information technology in the context of trans-Atlantic corporate transactions, financing 
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2 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Patentability of 
Computer-Implemented Inventions, 2002 O.J. (C 151) 5 [hereinafter Proposed Directive], available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/ce151/ce15120020625en01290131.pdf (June 25, 2002). 
3 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Patentability of Computer-
Implemented Inventions, COM(02)92 final at 2 [hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum], available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/comp/com02-92en.pdf (February 20, 2002). 
4 Id. at 2-3.  See also Ingo Kober, Address at Software Patents in Europe Conference at the Patent Office at the 
Queen Elizabeth Conference Centre in London (March 23, 1998) (transcript available at 
http://www.patent.gov.uk/about/ippd/softpat/1420.htm) (noting that the European Patent Office alone has granted 
over 20,000 software-related patents). 
5 See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2. 
6 See id. 
economy, and in light of the current instability of global markets, any increase in investment in this sector has 
the potential to provide sizeable downstream economic relief. 
¶3 Increased investment in innovation has historically been viewed as a direct corollary to increased 
protection, and the common and civil law systems throughout Europe have legislated on the general notion 
that a reward in the form of exclusive proprietary rights is necessary to encourage continued innovation.  The 
continued expansion of the scope and duration of patent and copyrights has been routinely justified on this 
basis, and although the European Commission refused to lift the “as such” exclusion on patentability, it 
explicitly reserved this option for the future.7  The idea is to wait and see how the US software market fares 
given the less stringent patentability standard of the US Patent Act and act accordingly. 
¶4 If the goal is to encourage market entry for individual programmers and small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) – as it should be within the framework of the European Treaty – then the European 
Commission is evaluating the wrong end of the proprietary rights spectrum.  Market analysis firm Gartner 
Dataquest estimates that large corporate software development companies have gained 5% of the total 
software market from the independent developers and SMEs in the last two years.8  The Eurolinux Alliance, 
an organization which promotes open standards and open source software, relied on similar data during the 
discussion phase preceding the release of the Proposed Directive.9  The alternative, Eurolinux asserts, is a 
move towards full competition and a free market economy, exactly what the European Treaty envisages for 
the EU as a whole. 
¶5 Given the uncertain financial sustainability of the open-source movement, what is presently needed is 
an intermediary legal regime which continues to offer the traditional reward of exclusive rights, but on a more 
competitive basis.  In the context of computer programs, trade secret laws have proven most effective in their 
ability to protect source code, elements of new software products awaiting patent issue, and subject matter 
falling outside the scope of traditional patent and copyright laws.10  Information in the form of a computer 
program may be protected, giving the proprietor the power to enjoin another from improprietous acquisition 
of source code and to prevent use of secret information as a “springboard” to future development.11 
                                                     
7 See id. at 11. 
8 See Joanne M. Correia, Software Market Stalled in Global Economy’s Slow Engine, at 
http://www4.gartner.com/pages/story.php.id.3350.s.8.jsp (Feb. 28, 2003). 
9 See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 4. 
10 See Computer Assos. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 717 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Trade secret protection, the 
branch of unfair competition law at issue in this case, remains a ‘uniquely valuable’ weapon in the defensive arsenal 
of computer programmers. Precisely because trade secret doctrine protects the discovery of ideas and systems which 
are explicitly precluded from coverage under copyright laws, courts and commentators alike consider it a necessary 
and integral part of intellectual property protection extended to computer programs.” (internal citations omitted)). 
11 See ROBERT DEAN, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 444 (The Law Book Co. Ltd. 1990). 
SOFTWARE PATENTS IN EUROPE 
¶6 Protection of computer software in Europe is achieved through a rubric of copyright and patent laws.  
While copyright offers the creative individual proprietary rights in the expression of a computer program, 
“[t]he ideas and principles that underlie any element of a program (including those underlying those parts of a 
program that provide for interconnection and interaction between elements of software and hardware 
(‘interfaces’)” are specifically excluded from copyrightability.12  The challenge, therefore, is to sweep the 
uncopyrightable elements of computer software within the scope of patentability.  “The valuable aspect of 
software is the inventive skill in the concept behind the program.  But the law has no means of giving such a 
concept protection.”13 
¶7 While the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (“EPC”) fails to specifically define the term 
“invention,” the following are not to be considered “inventions”:  schemes, rules and methods for performing 
mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers.14   These are perhaps patentable 
as a component to an otherwise patentable invention, but are not to receive protection “as such.”15 
¶8 Rule 29(1) of the EPC requires that patent claims disclose the “technical features” of an invention.16 
This has evolved into a “technical solution to a technical problem” requirement which has proven to be the 
driving force behind the EPO Technical Board of Appeal decisions regarding the patentability of computer 
software.17 
¶9 EPO practice, and by implementation, the practice of the national patent offices of the EU Member 
States, was amended in light of the Technical Board of Appeal’s decision in IBM T 1173/97 and T 0935/97.  
Both decisions refer to claims for software which, when run on a general purpose computer, cause the 
computer to function differently than the manufacturer intended.18  The computer effectively becomes a new 
                                                     
12 Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 
42, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=31991L0250&
model=guichett (May 17, 1991). 
13 DEAN, supra note 11, at 414-15. 
14 Convention on the Grant of European Patents [EPC], Oct. 5, 1973, art. 52(2)(c), 13 I.L.M. 268, 285, available at 
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ma1.html (last modified May 1, 2003). 
15 Id. at art. 52(3). 
16 Id. at R. 29(1), available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ma2.html#REG (last modified May 
1, 2003); see also VICOM/Computer-Related Invention, T208/84, [1987] E.P.O.R. 74, 79 (Technical Bd. App. 
1986) [hereinafter VICOM] (“The Board considers that this condition is met if the features mentioned in the claims 
will be understood by those skilled in the art as referring to the technical means for carrying out the functions 
specified by such features.”), available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/t840208ep1.htm (July 
15, 1986). 
17 See, e.g., IBM/Semantically-related expressions, T52/85, [1989] E.P.O.R. 454, 459-60 (Technical Bd. App. 1989) 
[hereinafter IBM/Semantically-related expressions], available at http://legal.european-patent-
office.org/dg3/biblio/t850052eu1.htm (Mar. 16, 1989); VICOM, supra note 16. 
18 See IBM/Computer programs, T1173/97, [2000] E.P.O.R. 219, 229-30 (Technical Bd. App. 1998), available at 
http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t971173ex1.pdf (July 1, 1998); IBM/Computer programs, T935/97, 
machine when software is incorporated.  The “new machine” concept conforms to the patentability criteria of 
novelty and inventive step under EPC Article 52(1), and in principle ensures that only those inventions which 
make a significant contribution to existing technology, when considered as a whole, will be rewarded with 
protection.19  Claims specifying a programmed computer system or its technologically equivalent process 
would no longer be categorically denied if the program at issue made a technical contribution to the state of 
the art.20   
¶10 The IBM decisions would never have the harmonizing effect intended by the EPO, for the simple 
reason that decisions of the EPO Technical Review Board are persuasive but not binding.21  Varying 
interpretations amongst the courts of the EU Member States have resulted in unpredictability in the potential 
outcome of decisions both on a case-by-case and State-by-State basis.22  Recently, such unpredictability came 
to be viewed as having a negative impact on Community goals of a common market and gave rise to 
suggested changes in the current state of the law.23 
¶11 Discussions for change began with the 1997 Green Paper on the Community Patent and the Patent 
System in Europe.24  The key points in these discussions focused on the need for harmonization in national 
laws, increased certainty in the Community-wide patent system, and the elimination of the “as such” per-se 
exception to patentability.  The negotiations process lasted more than three years, concluding with a final 
round of discussions in October 2000.  Member States were offered the opportunity to make final comments 
on two basic proposals: first, the need for Community action towards harmonization and second, an 
examination of specific provisions of national laws with considerations of how best to achieve 
harmonization.25 
¶12 The Proposed Directive does not actually create new patentable subject matter (as some Member 
States and industry representatives hoped it might) but rather clarifies existing rules in an attempt to diminish 
the differences amongst the Member States’ implementation of those rules.26  Key to the Proposed Directive 
is the definition of a “computer-implemented invention” as “any invention the performance of which involves 
                                                                                                                                                                           
[1999] E.P.O.R. 301, 312 (Technical Bd. App. 1999), available at http://legal.european-patent-
office.org/dg3/pdf/t970935eu1.pdf (Feb. 4, 1999). 
19 See VICOM, supra note 16, at 80-81. 
20 See id. 
21 See GERALD PATERSON, THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT 
CONVENTION 11 (Sweet and Maxwell, 2001). 
22 See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that implementation of the IBM decisions differed 
among States and between States and the EPO).  See also Patent Office Practice Notice, [1999] R.P.C. 563, 565 
(noting the differences between the English Patent Office and EPO practice prior to the IBM T935/97 and T1173/97 
decisions). 
23 See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 3. 
24 See generally Promoting innovation through patents: Green Paper on the Community patent and the patent system 
in Europe, COM(1997)314 final. 
25 See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 3.  
26 See id. 
the use of a computer, computer network or other programmable apparatus and having one or more prima 
facie novel features which are realised wholly or partly by means of a computer program or computer 
programs.”27  The conditional requirements of technical, non-obvious contribution to a technical field are 
maintained, and the Commission highlights the dangers of lowering the standards for patentability (as it 
claims the US has done in its zeal to offer patents to computer-related inventions).28  
¶13 It is unclear how the Proposed Directive will make any strides towards alleviating the potential for 
conflicting interpretations in the national courts.  EU Regulations and Directives are binding on the EU 
Member States alone, and do not have a direct impact on the application of the EPC.29  At best, Directives 
mandating behavior differing from EPO practice may be viewed as a persuasive indication that there is a need 
for change or a different interpretation of an EPC provision.30  Although the “as such” exception remains, the 
Economic and Social Council of the EU notes that the “Directive makes it possible to patent a programmed 
computer or programmed network or a process implemented through the execution of a program. . . . The 
door thus seems wide open to a software patent, as no programmable electronic hardware can operate without 
software and as the distinction between software ‘by itself’ and ‘software producing technical results,’ the 
product of legal casuistry, is indefinable in practice as all software is made to run on a computer or an 
electronic component, either as a system or as an application.”31 
¶14 It is equally unclear how the Proposed Directive will achieve its goal of facilitating market entry for 
SMEs.  The Commission identifies the problem as one of lack of communication, setting the priority in its 
explanatory memorandum of better informing SMEs, individual programmers and others about the benefits 
and ease of patent application.32  The Commission notably fails to acknowledge the expense and delay 
associated with the patent application process.  In a flagging economy where even the industry giants are 
cutting R&D expenditures and are managing their IP portfolios more frugally, it is unreasonable to assume 
that greater familiarity with the patent system will lead to increased market access for higher risk, 
undercapitalized start-ups and SMEs. 
¶15 SMEs in the IT industry have already figured out that the patent system is the cause of, not the 
solution to, to their exclusion from the European software market.  They see the industry giants benefiting 
from the extensive scope and duration of protection and logically conclude that the patent system is working 
against them.  The commercial reality is that the twenty years of protection which follow a lengthy and costly 
administrative procedure are better suited to a cash-cow invention to be offered in a less dynamic market. 
                                                     
27 Proposed Directive, supra note 2, at art. 2. 
28 See id. 
29 See PATERSON, supra note 21, at 12. 
30 See id. at 12-13. 
31 Economic and Social Council of the European Union, ESC 2002:09: Europe should reconfirm non-patentability 
of software!, at http://swpat.ffii.org/vreji/papri/eubsa-swpat0202/esc0209/index.en.html (Sept. 2002). 
32 See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 4. 
THE EUROPEAN SOFTWARE MARKET 
¶16 While the global trend has consistently been a lengthening of the duration of intellectual property 
rights, the average shelf-life of software products has been shrinking proportionately.  Meanwhile, and in 
spite of the general economic downturn, the software market continues to expand.  Estimated at €56.7 billion 
in 2000, the value of the European software market in 2005 is forecasted to nearly double to €109.3 billion.33 
¶17 Much of the profit to be realized immediately follows a product’s launch in the market.34  Delaying 
market launch pending the administrative process of securing proprietary rights not only hinders the 
availability of new technology to society but retards and reduces the return on investment (ROI) earned once 
the product is finally launched.  By the time protection is secured, technology will have surged forward; if it 
hasn’t, it should have, and this is only further proof of the way the present patent system hinders rather than 
encourages innovation.35  “Because of the potentially limited time span in which technology will be 
marketable (and, therefore, valuable), any errors in striking the balance between unfettered use and strictly 
enforced restrictions [through traditional intellectual property regimes] can have catastrophic 
consequences.”36 
¶18 As for “strictly enforced restrictions,” these are tolerated by the European Treaty and the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in the context of intellectual property rights but not warmly welcomed.  ECJ decisions 
confirm that intellectual property rights holders have a limited power to restrict competition.37  The nature of 
intellectual property rights is the power to exclude, and a monopoly environment can easily be facilitated by 
industry standards.  Where consumer demand can be adequately met by supply for a given, standardized 
product (such as a software suite) perceived to be of necessity by the market as a whole, proprietary rights can 
function as a locking mechanism.  Once hooked, consumers will remain with a particular product because the 
costs associated with switching to a new product, even to one of superior technological capability, may be 
perceived as too high to justify the switch.38  The scope and duration of intellectual property rights thus bear a 
                                                     
33 Business Software Alliance, The Thriving European Software Industry, at 2, at 
http://global.bsa.org/usa/policyres/admin/2002-04-17.108.pdf (Apr. 17, 2002). 
34 William Kingston, Intellectual Property Needs Help From Accounting, 11 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REVIEW 508, 510 (2002). 
35 James Bassen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents and Imitation, at 4-6, at 
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/patent.pdf (January 2000) (including statistical analysis demonstrating that 
strong patent policies hinder innovation).  See also Kingston, supra note 34 (“The public interest requires that 
inventions should be made, then innovated, and then diffused as quickly and widely as possible…. Unfortunately, 
much innovation diffusion at present is the result of failure of the patent system to deliver the protection it promises- 
especially in non-chemical fields.”  (internal citations omitted)). 
36 Doris Estelle Long, The Protection of Information Technology in a Culturally Diverse Marketplace, 15 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 129, 166 (1996). 
37 See, e.g., Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I-743 
(recognizing the right of intellectual property rights holders to restrict competition). 
38 See Martin Brampton, Devil’s Advocate: Handcuffed by the Industry Standard, at 
http://www.silicon.com/opinion/500017/1/1031575.html (Feb. 26, 2002) (noting that software “vendors use 
proprietary standards to prevent freedom of choice and to pre-empt future purchase decisions. When they are able to 
direct relationship to the number of commercially available alternatives and to the consuming public’s 
willingness to even consider those alternatives. 
¶19 The industry giants are understandably quick to defend their proprietary rights against “unfettered 
use.”  The open source software movement, which encourages unhampered access to source code and pooling 
of programming results, has been labeled an “intellectual property destroyer.”39  A General Public License 
(GPL) functions not to discourage incremental development and modification but to require that these be 
made available to others.40  Software development is unique in that the “stepping stone” development style is 
not plagiaristic convenience but a technological necessity.41 
¶20 The Eurolinux Alliance for a Free Information Infrastructure (“Eurolinux”) identifies itself as an 
“open coalition of commercial companies and non-profit associations united to promote and protect a 
vigourous European software culture based on copyright, open standards, open competition and open source 
software such as Linux.”42  The organization includes among its goals protecting and promoting “competition 
and innovation in the IT industry.”43 
¶21 Progress in the area of computer science occurs by means of incremental innovation: “programmers 
commonly adopt software design elements . . . by looking around for examples or remembering what worked 
in other programs.  These elements are sometimes adopted wholesale, but often they are adapted to a new 
context or set of tasks.  In this way, programmers contribute to and benefit from a cumulative innovation 
process.”44  Open source programmers recognize the need to tailor individual reward to meet the needs of this 
unique development style. 
¶22 The key difference between open source and today’s proprietary rights regime is one of coordination.  
“To be successful, open source must also be designed in a modular way so that groups of programmers can 
work independently on different components.”45   While acknowledging the need to borrow from and build 
                                                                                                                                                                           
speak of their strictly licensed exclusive technology as 'industry standard' they are at an advanced stage in their 
marketing programme.”). 
39 Survey: Out in the Open, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2001, at 8 [hereinafter Survey] (quoting James Allchin of 
Microsoft). 
40 See id. 
41 See Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Intl, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 818 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided 
court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (“We also note that in most contexts, there is no need to ‘build’ upon other people’s 
expression, for the ideas conveyed by that expression can be conveyed by someone else without copying the first 
author’s expression.  In the context of methods of operation, however . . . . [o]riginal [software] developers are not 
the only people entitled to build on the methods of operation they create; anyone can.”) 
42 Eurolinux Alliance for a Free Information Infrastructure, About Eurolinux, at 
http://www.eurolinux.org/index.en.html (last modified October 6, 2003).  Linux, an operating system available to 
the public at no charge, was created in 1991 by Finnish student Linus Torvalds. 
43 Eurolinux Alliance for a Free Information Infrastructure, About Eurolinux, at 
http://www.eurolinux.org/about/index.en.html (last modified September 21, 2003). 
44 Paula Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COL. L.REV. 
2308, 2330-31 (1994). 
45 Survey, supra note 39. 
upon existing technological platforms, the approach ensures a focused, non-duplicative outlay of resources.  
Rather than waste time, energy and financial resources in searching for new ways around existing proprietary 
concepts, open source integrates them seamlessly and efficiently. 
¶23 Predictions were, and certainly the industry giants hoped, that the open source movement was merely 
another IT fad that would quickly lose notoriety.46  It bears noting that, within two years of its 
overwhelmingly successful IPO in December 1999, the American open source corporation VA Linux Systems 
cut nearly twenty-five percent of its staff.47  Early 2001 projections concluded that it would take longer – 
almost a year longer – to achieve profitability.48  In contrast to more traditional software development firms, 
VA Linux Systems derives its profits from the sale of customized server platforms (or “kernels”) and the 
services associated with implementing an open source network.49 
¶24 The financial sustainability of the open source movement is currently being tested, in the midst of 
market conditions relatively hostile to start-up ventures and high-risk investment.  Europe should be using this 
opportunity not only to evaluate the US patent system, with its less stringent patentability standards in the 
context of computer software, but also the viability of the open source movement, with the end goal of 
providing market access to individual programmers and SMEs in mind. 
FILLING IN THE GAPS WITH COMMERCIAL FAIRNESS 
¶25 Even in the booming IT/dot.com market of the late 1990’s, concerns were raised about the potential 
for barriers to market access being artificially imposed on SMEs to the benefit of industry giants.50  Even 
within the common market, proprietary rights in intellectual assets offer commercial software manufacturers 
the power to restrict competition, retard growth and strategically plan releases of new technology.51  
Copyrights and patents are, by their very nature, intended to provide a monopoly.52  Basic economic 
principles teach that the absence of artificial restraints on the market, in this case, intellectual property rights, 
                                                     
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. 
49 The penguin gets serious, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2001, at 64. 
50 The European Commission notes in its Explanatory Memorandum that the issue of patentability of computer 
software intensified in 1999, when SMEs and open source advocates joined the debate, arguing that the present 
patent system offers them insufficient protection against larger market players.  These concerns were heartily voiced 
during the European continuation of the American Microsoft antitrust trial.  Bundling, it was noted, has a 
“significant effect on [Microsoft’s] ability to enter new markets and tackle the smaller software companies that are 
in a niche.”  Robert J. McCartney, In Europe, Microsoft Faces a Harder Sell, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2003, at E01. 
51 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. Rev. 839, 
882-97 (1990). 
52 See Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896) (“It is self-evident that on the expiration of a 
patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent 
becomes public property.”).  But see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 1 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 601 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., The Univ. of Chicago Press 1986), 
leads to a fully competitive market.53  The financial advantage to any one firm is limited to the time it takes 
others to develop a newer, more technologically advanced product.54 
¶26 In an industry in which progress demands access to an existing technological platform, and in the 
absence of proprietary controls, the greatest threat to continued innovation and investment is the potential for 
piracy.55  Even the present proprietary rights regime has proven incapable of effectively addressing this issue; 
a study conducted by International Planning and Research in the year 2000 and cited by the Business 
Software Alliance in its 2002 report on the health of the European software industry found that more than 
thirty percent of software on Western European computers was unlawfully downloaded.56  The value of this 
loss was estimated at €3.4 billion, six percent of the value of the entire European software industry.57 
¶27 The solution to the problem lies not in harmonized proprietary rights schemes, as the Business 
Software Alliance proposes,58 but in the implementation of universally accepted principles of commercial 
fairness.  Trade secret law has historically been used to fill in the gaps left between other forms of intellectual 
property rights.  Where copyright will not extend protection to ideas and utilitarian methods and where patent 
protection cannot be granted on grounds of obviousness or lack of novelty, trade-secret protection may rescue 
works from immediate depository in the public domain. 
¶28 Trade secret law has a larger role to fill in the context of computer software.  More than a gap-filler 
between copyright and patent, trade secret law reinforced by contract provisions and the use of new 
encryption technologies can effectively address unauthorized disclosure in the time period when this is most 
needed, immediately following a product’s launch on the market.  While it opens market access to individual 
developers and SMEs by eliminating the administrative delay and expense of a national proprietary rights 
                                                                                                                                                                           
available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s25.html (2000) (“[i]nventions . . . cannot, in 
nature, be a subject of property” because an idea is “incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.”). 
53 See generally Merges & Nelson, supra note 51, at 908 (describing the way in which patent rights were used to 
block advances by competitors in specific industries, such as the automobile industry, semiconductor chips, and 
early electric devices and concluding that “multiple and competitive sources of invention” will best encourage 
innovation and that patent law should “encourage inventive rivalry.”). 
54 See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 821 (Bodin, C.J., concurring) (“[I]f a better spreadsheet comes along, it is hard to see why 
customers who have learned the Lotus menu and devised macros for it should remain captives of Lotus because of 
an investment in learning made by the users and not by Lotus.  Lotus has already reaped a substantial reward for 
being first; assuming that the Borland program is now better, good reasons exist for freeing it to attract old Lotus 
customers: to enable the old customers to take advantage of a new advance, and to reward Borland in turn for 
making a better product.  If Borland has not made a better product, then customers will remain with Lotus anyway.” 
(emphasis added)). 
55 The Thriving European Software Industry, supra note 33, at 5. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. at 5-7. 
system, trade secret laws allow the industry giants the opportunity to achieve ROI in the period during which 
the product is most profitable.59 
¶29 This time period is protected by making unauthorized access actionable.  This is enforceable on a 
number of juridical levels, including unfair competition, the law of confidence, criminal sanctions and 
contract.60  Considered as a whole, this body of law can be applied to improprietous acquisition of trade 
secrets by employees, competitors and software users. 
¶30 The “secret” nature of the information is key, and in practice this means that a decision must be made 
prior to filing for a patent, as the filing itself is disclosure and thus destroys secrecy.  For obvious reasons, 
therefore, trade secret laws present no formal filing or registration procedure and they do not require novelty 
or utility.61  Correspondingly, they lack the benefit of a relatively dependable duration of protection and 
formal system for seeking remedies.62   Once a trade secret is disclosed, it is irreparably a part of the public 
domain. 
¶31 The launch of a new software product onto the market will not explicitly disclose the secrets of its 
inner workings.  Source code, being readable by humans, is especially susceptible to prying eyes.  For this 
reason, the majority of mass-produced software products enter the market in object code form.63  Access to 
what is presently deemed an unprotectable idea is only possible through decompilation or reverse 
engineering.64 
¶32 The effort which goes into reverse engineering may equal or exceed that necessary to create the 
original program.65  Reverse engineering, therefore, does not interfere with a software product’s natural shelf 
life; in the time it takes for others to reverse engineer the market leader’s code, the market leader is achieving 
ROI driven by characteristically high volume consumer demand. 
¶33 Decompilation, copying and other means of unfair access may be addressed in contractual provisions, 
violations of which may lead to civil and/or criminal sanctions.  By controlling individual behavior through 
                                                     
59 See Kingston, supra note 34, at 512 (“Lead time is recognised by businessmen as one of the best ways of 
protecting investment in innovation.”). 
60 See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES 1307 (West Group Publishing 2001). 
61 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (“Novelty and invention are not requisite for a trade secret as 
they are for patentability.”). 
62 See DEAN, supra note 11, at 24-25. 
63 John C. Yates & Anthony E. DiResta, Software Support and Hardware Maintenance Practices: Tying 
Considerations, 8 THE COMPUTER LAWYER 17, 18-19 (1991). 
64  See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992).  Decompilation is a 
mechanical process wherein a program’s code is inserted into a computerized machine called a decompiler, which 
mechanically reconstructs the program’s source code.  COMPUTER LAW 219 (Chris Reed & John Angel eds., 
Blackstone Press Ltd. 4th ed. 2002).  Reverse engineering, in contrast, is a painstaking manual procedure which 
often fails to yield immediate or accurate results.  Methods of reverse engineering include the following:  reading 
design notes and other materials about the program; observing a program in operation and its effects on a computer; 
performing a static evaluation of the program instructions; and performing a dynamic evaluation of the program 
instructions as the program is being run on a computer. 
65 See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1237 (3d Cir. 1986). 
universally accepted principles of corporate fairness, protection is limited to the time in which it is needed 
most without a corresponding decrease in the overall incentive to invent. 
CONCLUSION 
¶34 The European Treaty tolerates the barriers to trade created by intellectual property rights, but the 
European Commission has not yet discovered how to prevent these barriers from being erected against 
individual programmers and SMEs in the IT industry.  The Proposed Directive recognizes this problem and 
suggests that the way to address it is by informing SMEs of the function and benefit of intellectual property 
rights.  Yet even in a healthy economy, SMEs are faced with high risk challenges to capitalization and 
investment.  In today’s global economic downturn across the business sectors, it is unreasonable to assume 
that underfunded start-ups and small businesses in a market traditionally dominated by corporate giants will 
be able to make the time and financial investment necessary to apply for proprietary rights. 
¶35 Nor is it clear if SMEs had these proprietary rights whether these would prove beneficial.66  The 
problem lies in computer software’s inability to fit neatly within either of the traditional intellectual property 
regimes of patent and copyright.  The principles behind the function of a general purpose computer are 
viewed as fundamental, predictable and unoriginal.  This is clearly evidenced in various EPO Technical Board 
of Appeal decisions refusing to grant protection to so-called inventions which do nothing more than make a 
general purpose computer perform a standard task.67  Under the Proposed Directive, a patentable computer-
implemented invention must be made to perform a non-standard task.  To achieve this, a programmer must 
necessarily start with the platform that accomplishes the standard task and contribute to it or modify it in 
some way.  Access to that original platform is necessary, and innovation is therefore delayed where access is 
limited by the extensive scope and duration of proprietary rights. 
¶36 The current IP regime, as it is applied to computer software, fails to consider this unique “stepping 
stone” development style.  It also ignores the market realities inherent in the IT industry.  “Given the short 
span of viability of most technology, by the time protection attaches under TRIPs, much of today’s 
technology will have lost market value.”68 
¶37 The existence of the open source movement is, at a minimum, proof that the computer software 
industry recognizes the characteristics of its market and the possibility that the current protection schemes are 
inappropriate in this context.  A release of computer-related inventions into a free market economy facilitates 
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market entry for individual programmers and SMEs but also carries with it a heightened potential for piracy 
and thus potentially less incentive to create. 
¶38 Trade secret law places the burden of secrecy on the software developer while simultaneously 
confining employees, competitors and users to a set behavioral standard based on commercial fairness.  While 
secrecy may be viewed as a key argument against trade secret protection for other intellectual products, 
computer software should not give rise to such concerns.  The temporal nature of the technology will dictate 
the market and the developer who intends to capitalize on his innovation does not have the leisurely option of 
withholding a new product from the public; a competitor will quickly fill any unsatisfied consumer demand.  
The increasing size and value of the European software market should be sufficient encouragement to develop 
new computer-related inventions and disclose these in a timely manner.  This too, is the advantage of which 
open source advocates are most proud, the ability of their programs to adapt quickly and seamlessly to rapidly 
evolving consumer expectations.  Trade secrets are not explicitly disclosed when software products are 
launched on the market; these are technologically decipherable, but access should be limited to commercially 
acceptable means. 
¶39 Although trade barriers are tolerated in the form of intellectual property rights, more effort should be 
made to bring technology-related inventions in line with market realities and the common market principles of 
the EU Treaty.  If the European Commission’s goal is to facilitate market access for individual programmers 
and SMEs, the focus should be on increasing competition and not on increasing monopoly powers.  Where 
market failure may yet be a risk for the open source movement, trade secret law presupposes that sufficient 
lead time is provided “to overcome the problem of appropriability inherent in public goods.”69 
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